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Abstract 
Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies 
have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as 
arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills 
that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and 
proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. 
It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president 
should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, 
presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and 
stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested 
using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The 
analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights 
the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international 
audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes 
and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian 
legislatures. 
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Introduction 
On 29 December 2016 Russian president Vladimir Putin vetoed a bill introducing an 
“Electronic Database of Students”; just one year earlier, his Kazakh counterpart 
Nursultan Nazarbayev used his veto power to send the new Civil Service Act back to 
parliament. Presidents’ use of their legislative veto is generally one of the most common 
features of inter-branch competition across political systems. However, Nazarbayev had 
not used his veto power in almost two and a half years, whereas for Putin it was even 
the first veto in over four years. Even more importantly, both Kazakhstan and Russia 
arguably present model cases of contemporary authoritarian regimes – superficially, 
they possess a modern institutional structure and hold elections, yet in reality they lack 
genuine competition between political actors.1 
Scholarship on authoritarian legislatures traditionally assumed that they lack 
independent decision-making power.2 From this perspective, Putin’s and Nazarbayev’s 
vetoes appear illogical. Yet, even if we consider recent studies, which have 
convincingly argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” of 
executive proposals and have shown that legislators can successfully enact their own 
amendments and proposals, there is no evidence that legislators would ever knowingly 
contravene presidential preferences.3 Hence, Putin’s and Nazarbayev’s decisions to veto 
remain counterintuitive. Finally, other authoritarian regimes exhibit the same 
phenomenon – every so often, their presidents still use their prerogative to veto bills 
passed by the legislature.4 Consequently, the examples from Kazakhstan and Russia 
raise a bigger question: why do authoritarian presidents (need to) use their legislative 
veto power at all? 
Research on legislative veto use and its determinants has so far concentrated on 
democratic political systems where the veto is president’s “primary check” on the 
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legislature.5 Theoretical models generally rely on the assumption of mutual 
independence of political institutions, yet it stands to reasons whether this can also be 
applied to regimes where mechanisms of democratic governance are suspended or 
working ineffectively. Moreover, while authoritarian constitutions vest presidents with a 
vast range of prerogatives, actual “power” is by and large exerted through informal 
means of governance or executive decrees.6 Thus, authoritarian presidents’ decision to 
intervene directly into the legislative process, if only occasionally, and use a power 
designed as a check-and-balance between independent institutions presents a substantial 
theoretical and empirical puzzle in want of explanation. 
The aim of this article is to extend recent research on elected authoritarian 
legislatures and to propose a systematic explanation of veto use in authoritarian 
regimes. To do so, I first review relevant scholarship on legislative veto power, 
authoritarian presidents, and legislatures in non-democratic regimes, and then discuss 
the key insights on which I build my theoretical approach. I start from the well-
established argument that authoritarian presidents create (or tolerate) elected legislatures 
to increase regime stability. Further, I propose that presidents may dictate the legislative 
agenda, but at the same time devolve limited legislative decision-making power to 
subordinate actors as part of power-sharing arrangements. Thereby, any bills that go 
beyond the constraints set by the president should usually be stopped or amended by 
actors loyal to the regime (e.g. in second chambers) before they reach the president. 
Consequently, presidents should only use their veto for two reasons: (1) the protection 
of the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and (2) to reinforce or increase 
presidents’ power vis-à-vis other actors. The arguments are tested in case studies of 
Kazakhstan and Russia – two electoral autocracies that are not only largely 
representative of modern authoritarian regimes (particularly in the post-Soviet space) 
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but also allow for validating the proposed causal mechanisms based on detailed 
legislative data. The analysis shows that presidential vetoes could largely be attributed 
to a desire to prevent policy outcomes that threatened regime stability and shift blame to 
subordinate actors. In addition, it highlights the value of vetoes as a means of 
distraction, especially with regard to international audiences. 
The primary contribution of this study lies in the extension of research on 
presidential veto power beyond the realm of democratic regimes. On a theoretical level, 
it complements and extends work on elected authoritarian legislatures and policy-
making, chiming in particular with the recent departure from the assumption that they 
are mere “rubberstamps”. Empirically, it provides novel insights into the hitherto 
understudied interaction between presidents and elected legislatures as part of the 
legislative process in authoritarian regimes. Finally, the findings highlight the particular 
usefulness of legislative vetoes as part of a “rational dictator’s” toolkit. 
Presidential veto power and policy-making in democratic and authoritarian 
regimes 
Presidents’ power to veto legislation represents their “most consistent and direct 
connection with the legislative process”, and equips them with a powerful means to 
express disapproval, prevent changes in the status quo, or press concessions.7 
Scholarship on presidents’ engagement with policy-making and veto use has thereby 
almost exclusively focused on countries with a substantial democratic track record.8 
Here, veto use is generally conceptualized as a function of disagreements between 
president and parliament over policy. Game-theoretical approaches predict that vetoes 
occur when the legislature proposes legislation that is too far removed from presidents’ 
ideal points – either because of incomplete information or to trigger a “blame-game 
veto”.9 Similarly, studies of patterns of presidential activism have found that – across 
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democratic political systems – veto use is significantly correlated with ideological 
opposition between presidents and legislative majorities and the size of the governing 
majority.10 Notably, both strands of the literature see vetoes as the outcome of conflict 
between two mutually independent institutional actors. 
In contrast, research on authoritarian presidents and their relationship with 
parliaments has largely focussed on the role of legislatures and other institutions in 
buttressing the regime as a whole (see also next section).11 Scholarship is typically 
concerned with how president bypass the legislative process altogether – most 
prominently by issuing executive decrees or directives.12 Furthermore, authors have 
highlighted that modern authoritarian rule relies heavily on (informal) networks and 
system of patronage within the ruling elite as means to exercise power.13 Such networks 
may include “parties of power”, yet these tend to be conceptualized as presidents’ 
extended arm in parliament and mere means to push through legislation, not as actors 
with agency.14 While measures of presidents’ constitutional powers have also been 
applied to non-democratic regimes15, there are hardly any attempts to systematically 
collect data on their use.16 Finally, there is a paucity of systematic theoretical accounts 
of presidential behaviour as most scholars either focus only on a single country and 
president, or seek to explicate the endurance of authoritarian rule more generally. 
Thus, there is no readily available explanation of presidential veto use in 
authoritarian regimes. In particular, it stands to reason to what extent we can 
conceptualize authoritarian presidents and parliaments as mutually independent actors 
capable of disagreement. Unfortunately, the only game-theoretic analysis of presidential 
veto power that included authoritarian countries failed to address the potentially 
different working mechanisms of institutions under authoritarian rule.17 Furthermore, 
even more general theoretical models of political institutions usually conceptualize 
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dictators as the only veto players in non-democratic regimes and would not predict 
legislative proposals that deviate from their preferences.18 Hence, the key question 
remains when and under what conditions authoritarian parliaments produce outcomes 
that necessitate a presidential veto, or whether vetoes are motivated by different factors. 
Therefore, the next section discusses literature on authoritarian legislatures and 
considers their potential for independent decision-making. 
Authoritarian legislatures and bargaining over policy 
Authoritarian legislatures come in different forms – they can be “closed” (non-
existent/without lawgiving powers), “appointed” (members selected by the executive), 
or “elected” (at least formally).19 Irrespective of such differences, the literature 
traditionally assumed that “because authoritarian legislatures exist at the discretion of 
the dictator, they do not have real decision-making power”.20 Rather, authors 
highlighted that the mere existence or creation of a (formally) elected legislature can 
increase regime stability. In particular, it has been asserted that holding regular 
parliamentary elections helps regimes create a “façade of democracy that enables them 
to maintain international and domestic legitimacy”,21 or are meant to present a credible 
commitment by the leader to other actors in the form of self-restriction (although it is 
doubtful to what extent such legislatures could actually provide a check on the 
president).22 Alternatively, authoritarian legislatures and elections are thought to equip 
leaders with a cost-effective way to monitor the political opposition – through election 
campaigns and by allowing deputies to speak freely without fear of retribution, threats 
can be neutralized quickly and regime stability ensured.23 Nevertheless, as these 
approaches generally assume that authoritarian legislatures merely “rubberstamp” 
presidential proposals, presidents would have little need to engage with the legislative 
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process (although the occasional use of vetoes may admittedly serve the creation of a 
democratic façade). 
More recently, scholars have explicated the mechanisms by which elected 
authoritarian legislature ensure regime stability in greater detail, and proposed different 
conceptualizations of legislatures that are either no longer implicitly based on 
“rubberstamp” assumptions or explicitly reject them. Most prominently, authors suggest 
that presidents use legislatures to bridle the opposition and other actors by giving them 
access to spoils in exchange for cooperation (“co-optation”),24 or to make credible 
commitments to other (rival) elites and distribute some power and information among 
them (“power-sharing”).25 Quantitative studies have shown that elected legislatures are 
indeed an effective means to prevent coups26 and increase the likelihood of autocratic 
regime survival.27 Similarly, legislative co-optation – particularly of key opposition 
figures – helps to decrease and mitigate public dissent, hence decreasing the need for 
repression.28 
Unfortunately, scholars have hitherto not explicitly discussed the consequences 
of co-optation and power-sharing for the law-making function of authoritarian 
legislatures. However, power-sharing models in particular would theoretically allow for 
some independent legislative activity by deputies, even if only within parameters set by 
the president. Furthermore, there is growing empirical evidence that authoritarian 
legislatures do possess some independent decision-making power; specifically, scholars 
have demonstrated that budget bills in authoritarian regimes often undergo significant 
changes.29 Noble and Schulmann consequently suggest a departure from the conception 
of authoritarian legislatures as mere “rubberstamps”. Rather, they should be 
conceptualized as “venue[s] – and the legislative stage of policymaking, more broadly, 
[…] as an opportunity – for executive, bureaucratic, and other powerful non-legislative 
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actors to contest their competing policy preferences”.30 Similarly, Krol asserts that 
“authoritarian parliaments constitute an arena through which the executive concedes 
changes in its legislation to its most loyal allies”. 31 Hence, when authoritarian 
legislatures act independently, this power depends on continued support for the dictator, 
and amendments are only enacted within the boundaries set by the regime.32 
The departure from the “rubberstamp” assumption opens the possibility for the 
use of presidential vetoes according to their original purpose – as a check-and-balance 
of the president on the legislature. However, authors have so far mostly formulated their 
theoretical considerations from the perspective of legislators and largely neglected to 
reflect on the specific role and motivations of presidents in the legislative process. 
Furthermore, even in approaches that explicitly attribute some independent decision-
making power to parliaments, bargaining notably takes place within the legislature – i.e. 
not between parliament and president as posited by existing theoretical accounts of 
presidential veto activity.33 To answer the question why authoritarian presidents use 
their legislative veto power nonetheless, the next section proposes a modified model of 
authoritarian policy-making. Based on the assumption that decision-making power is 
selectively devolved to elected legislatures, it explicates the conditions and strategic 
considerations that determine authoritarian presidents’ veto use. 
A model of veto use in authoritarian regimes 
Authoritarian presidents can be conceptualized as rational dictators whose ultimate goal 
is to stay in power.34 They may value holding office intrinsically, yet it is first and 
foremost prerequisite for continued access to spoils of the regime and implementing 
policy.35 Policy also has primarily instrumental value as it helps authoritarian leaders to 
overcome their lack of democratic legitimation by ensuring that the regime nonetheless 
delivers benefits to key actors and the public as a whole.36 Presidents also have the 
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power to shape the institutional and political environment, so that they are only 
restricted by existing institutions insofar as they are used to support their rule.37 Hence, 
authoritarian presidents support and create elected assemblies as arenas for co-operation 
with other (rival) elites and co-optation of opponents to avert rebellion or other threats 
to their rule.38 Although the spoils of legislative office may be sufficient for purposes of 
co-optation, presidents still face the problem of how to share at least some power with 
other elites. 
I propose that presidents devolve some decision-making power to legislatures 
and executive actors (e.g. ministries) involved in the legislative process to solve this 
problem and make a credible commitment. Legislatures thus become arenas for inter-
elite bargaining and competition over policy.39 However, capacity for independent 
action is only granted in selected areas and to the extent that it is absolutely necessary to 
sustain the president’s rule.40 Legislators and other actors are generally aware of 
presidential preferences; in non-devolved areas these are articulated more clearly 
(directly or indirectly/informally) and legislatures will consequently simply 
“rubberstamp” presidential proposals, or pass legislation within the constraints set by 
presidential decrees or previous presidential initiatives. However, the more presidents 
require legislatures as places for co-optation and power-sharing, the broader and the 
deeper devolved policy areas become. Consequently, presidential preferences are less 
clearly articulated to make a more credible commitment to legislators and other elites, 
and authoritarian presidents will accept bills or amendments that are further away from 
their ideal point. 
Authoritarian presidents rely on complex systems of informal politics and loyal 
actors in other institutions to exert their control. While we can generally expect that 
legislators will self-censor proposals that contravene presidential preferences, any other 
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bills which – inadvertently or (less likely) deliberately – go beyond the constraints set 
by the president should be stopped or amended before they reach the president’s desk, 
e.g. by second chambers41, “parties of power”42 or other administrative actors.43 While 
these mechanisms may fail and therefore necessitate presidential intervention, vetoes 
should generally only occur for two reasons: (1) the protection of the regime’s output 
legitimacy and stability, and (2) to reinforce and increase presidents’ personal power 
vis-à-vis other actors. 
Authoritarian presidents and their regimes do not receive their legitimation 
through elections in the same way as democratic governments. Therefore, (economic) 
regime performance and the associated output legitimacy becomes one of their most 
important tools.44 As outlined previously, presidents must ensure that the regime 
appears to act in the people’s interest and serves the actors on whom it relies (i.e. elites 
and/or the general population) if they want to stay in power and reap any associated 
benefits. Presidents can accomplish this goal by proactively formulating policies that 
benefit their constituents45 or use their informal networks to influence the policy-
making process in that direction. Naturally, this also means preventing policies from 
becoming law that run counter to this aim. However, whether a policy constitutes a 
threat to the regime’s output legitimacy is not always clear in advance, but can vary in 
response to exogenous factors. Most prominently, sudden changes in socio-economic 
conditions can affect the foundations of a bill;46 in fact, presidents may even be forced 
to veto popular policies if it transpires that the regime will not be able to live up to the 
bill’s provisions. Similarly, policies can provoke unanticipated levels of public 
discontent and resistance, and implementing them unchanged would have a 
considerable negative impact on the regime’s output legitimacy. Thus, in cases where 
adverse consequences of bills only become apparent at the very end of the legislative 
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process, we should expect presidents to veto them to protect the regime’s output 
legitimacy and long-term stability. 
Instability at the very top may well spell doom for authoritarian regimes, 
whereas governments can be dismissed, and parliaments reconfigured without 
threatening their stability. Therefore, presidents have strong incentives to reinforce their 
personal legitimacy and power vis-à-vis other actors, whereby vetoes are one of the 
most visible tools at their disposal. First, they can be used to shift blame away from the 
president to subordinate actors. If policies initiated by presidents are met with popular 
discontent, they can easily distance themselves from them and blame parliament, 
government, or individual cabinet ministers. Likewise, even in case of unpopular 
policies that are necessary to keep the regime functioning, a veto that only leads to 
cosmetic changes in legislation can still enhance presidents’ power and legitimacy – 
after all, it was their intervention that softened the impact of the policies in question. 
Second, presidents can also proactively “disable” failsafe mechanisms (that would 
otherwise have stopped unfavourable legislation) to create opportunities for self-
legitimization and discrediting rivals. Thus, vetoes occur because presidents seek to 
shift blame or, respectively, as a form of discursive pre-emption – “the staging of 
political dramas that undermine opponents’ efforts to gain popular support”.47 
Finally, it is important to note that, although conceptually different, a veto can 
theoretically serve both purposes at once; yet, we should still be able to distinguish their 
effects based on an analysis of the legislation concerned. More importantly, however, 
we need to consider that the use of a highly visible tool such as the veto is a double-
edged sword. In particular, an occasional veto use may be effective in reinforcing the 
president’s authority vis-à-vis other actors; yet, frequent use may create an impression 
of weakness or a lack of support among the ruling elite, as the president does not appear 
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to be able to quell conflict by other means. Thus, even if presidents’ last resort is to 
veto, they should only employ it if they believe that not vetoing would be more costly in 
the long run. Furthermore, overly frequent veto use could potentially be an expression 
of other phenomena – e.g. a crisis within the ruling elite or move towards greater 
autocratization – and provoke (or invite) social unrest. It is, admittedly, beyond the 
scope (and intention) of this framework to account for this – the hypotheses are 
primarily meant to apply in regimes where the president, rival elites and opposition 
forces find themselves in a relatively stable equilibrium.48 Finally, vetoes are naturally 
not authoritarian president’s only tool in dealing with legislatures; yet, given their 
visibility and institutional effectiveness they are particularly suited for the purposes 
outlined in this framework. 
  
Case selection and data 
Empirical studies of authoritarian regimes are faced with a number of difficulties, one 
of the greatest obstacles being the lack of governmental transparency, restricted access 
to documentation, and limited availability of reliable quantitative and qualitative data.49 
Unfortunately, these restrictions likewise apply to historical data on the legislative 
process and presidential vetoes. Therefore, this study takes a small-N approach to 
provide a tentative test of the theoretical considerations formulated in the previous 
section. Specifically, it uses case studies of two post-Soviet authoritarian regimes – 
Kazakhstan and Russia – that are not only largely representative of authoritarian 
regimes more generally, but also offer sufficient data availability50, making them 
particularly suited for analysis. 
Except for the Baltics, political transition in former Soviet republics has failed to 
produce Western-style liberal democracies. While some countries still experienced 
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periods of (limited) political pluralism following the fall of the Soviet Union or, less 
frequently, developed into hybrid regimes that oscillate between democracy and 
authoritarianism, others merely transitioned from one type of authoritarian system to the 
next. Thereby, the majority of countries is characterized by popularly elected presidents 
as the dominant executive actors who enjoy wide-ranging executive and legislative 
powers (including a package veto requiring a 2/3 majority for override), and by second 
chambers filled with members loyal to and (at least indirectly) chosen by the president 
(see Table 1). 
***Table 1*** 
 
Kazakhstan and Russia are largely representative of other post-Soviet hybrid and 
authoritarian regimes regarding the trajectory of their democratic/authoritarian 
development and institutional set-up. Both countries can be classified as “electoral 
autocracies” where regular multi-party parliamentary and multi-candidate presidential 
elections are held, yet these are neither free nor fair.51 While V-Dem (Figure 1) and 
Freedom House (Figure 2) differ in how quickly Russia’s level of authoritarianism 
increased after Putin’s first election in 2000, both countries are now clearly 
authoritarian. Furthermore, their respectively presidential and president-parliamentary 
regimes provide presidents with extensive leverage over cabinets and the policy-
process. Therefore, and given that president-parliamentary and presidential regimes 
generally exhibit lower levels of democratic performance across the region (cf. Table 1) 
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Finally, presidents in both countries still occasionally use their legislative veto 
power and parliaments have been shown to possess some independent decision-making 
power. Given the availability of sufficiently detailed legislative data, analysing the two 
cases allows for tracing and validating (or falsifying) the causal mechanisms proposed 
previously and thereby promises to produce generalizable findings on authoritarian 
presidents’ use of their legislative veto. The following two sections focus on the period 
2007–2018 in Kazakhstan (beginning with the fourth convocation of parliament) and 
2008–2018 in Russia (starting with Dimitry Medvedev’s election as president); I 
analyse the circumstances surrounding several vetoes (with a focus on more recent 
examples), paying particular attention to the potential consequences of the bills in 
question and the role of intra-elite conflict. 
Veto use in Kazakhstan, 2007-2018 
Nursultan Nazarbayev ruled Kazakhstan from December 1991 until March 2019, 
whereby his previous political career (Prime Minister, 1984-1989; Communist Party 
leader, 1989-1991) proved key to reforming the former Soviet republic into an 
authoritarian regime with him as the undisputed leader.54 Constitutional amendments 
following the country’s independence clearly established the presidency’s dominance 
over the executive. In both 1993 and 1995 Nazarbayev subsequently used his informal 
influence to dissolve parliament and force through new constitutions cementing his 
powers, including the right to reject the outcomes of parliamentary votes of no-
confidence in the government. Furthermore, term limits did not apply to Nazarbayev 
since 2002.55 The president’s veto power is equally strong – vetoes can only be 
overridden by 2/3 of members in both chambers of parliament and amendatory 
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observations are enacted automatically unless overridden by an absolute majority in 
both chambers. 
Despite presenting an almost archetypical case of an authoritarian regime, 
presidential vetoes still occur from time to time (Table 2). Even since the 2007 
constitutional amendments that allow the president to dissolve parliament with relative 
discretion, Nazarbayev returned bills to parliament on three separate occasions (and 
used a pocket veto on two further bills). Although the small absolute number of vetoes 
may partly be attributable to the comparatively low legislative output of parliament, the 
relative frequency still amounts to less than 0.4% of bills being vetoed. At the same 
time, evidence points to at least some independent decision-making capacity of 
parliament – legislators introduced up to a dozen private members’ bills per session 
(usually on economic regulations, civil service, culture and civil society) of which the 
majority eventually became law. Nevertheless, the Senate – stocked with appointees 
loyal to the president and his Nur Otan party – played an active role in moderating 
legislative activity; while it is difficult to collate reliable numbers (particularly for 





The individual vetoes reveal an interesting pattern that tentatively confirms my 
theoretical model. Nazarbayev’s vetoes in 2013 and 2015 corroborate the first 
hypothesis and illustrate how vetoes were used as a means to protect the regime’s 
output legitimacy and stability. The Law on Pension Insurance was passed in May 2013, 
yet already caused public discontent during the drafting stage – mostly because it raised 
Final author’s version of article published in Democratization – DOI: 10.1080/13510347/2019.1678029 
 16 
women’s retirement age from 58 to 63 starting in 2014 after previous reforms had 
already reduced mandatory minimums for alimony payments and a lump-sum maternity 
leave compensation.56 Nevertheless, the bill passed both Mazhilis and Senate without 
objections or significant amendments, likely because of the provisions’ economic 
necessity. Following the bill’s passage, public pressure on Nazarbayev increased; the 
threat to the regime’s output legitimacy was furthermore amplified by the fact that 
changes would take effect only one year before the next presidential election. Thus, 
when Nazarbayev vetoed the bill, used his amendatory observations to delay the 
implementation of any changes until 2018 (arguably a cosmetic change), and fired the 
responsible government minister,57 he did so to protect the output legitimacy and – 
particularly regarding the upcoming presidential election – stability of the regime. 
A similar picture emerges with regard to Nazarbayev’s veto of the Civil Service 
Act. Passed by parliament in October 2015 on the government’s initiative, the Act 
established a new overarching structure for the civil service and stipulated a mandatory 
retirement age for civil servants.58 However, it differentiated between administrative 
and political civil servants, whereby the retirement age did not apply to the latter. It 
appears that government and legislators generally tried to follow presidential 
preferences in adding the exception (explaining why other loyal actors did not intervene 
in the process). However, as there would also be no set retirement age for political civil 
servants appointed by government ministers, it gave them a small, yet significant source 
of additional power. The president’s subsequent veto – restricting the exception to 
political civil servants appointed by the president, who could extend their period of 
service by up to five years59 – thus served to maintain the power balance and removed a 
potential threat to Nazarbayev’s grip on the system. While blame-shifting was a 
welcome side-effect, it was not the dominant reason for the veto. 
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In contrast, the veto from March 2009 lends particular support for the hypothesis 
that authoritarian presidents use vetoes to reinforce their personal power vis-à-vis other 
actors. Parliament had passed a private member’s bill with the government’s support 
that – ostensibly following up on a remark by the president in a 2008 speech – extended 
the state holiday for the Kazakh New Year celebration (Nauryz) from one to three days, 
although only as a one-off. The bill was swiftly vetoed by the president, yet not because 
he opposed its general content (which enjoyed considerable public support). Rather, the 
veto must be interpreted as a warning shot against high-ranking elites in government 
and parliament. The government had used the bill to distract attention from its failures 
in the realm of economic reforms and counteracting the effects of the financial crisis60 – 
as noted previously, this was one of the areas in which there appears to be some 
capacity for independent policy-formulation. Thus, Nazarbayev used the veto and the 
accompanying statement to shift blame to the government and reinforce his personal 
power. Furthermore, one month later he signed a new version of the bill into law that – 
on his suggestion – made the extension of Nauryz permanent. 
Although not a veto as such, the issue of the “Leader of the Nation” bills also 
highlights a logic similar to that of the second hypothesis. In 2010 the “Law on the First 
President” (providing Nazarbayev with immunity and extensive privileges) was 
extended to provide additional spoils as well as the title “Leader of the Nation”.61 
Although clearly following presidential preferences, Nazarbayev refused to sign the two 
bills – a move that was widely interpreted as an attempt to downplay the issue and show 
humility.62 However, he did not formally return the bills to parliament; rather, this 
procedure triggered a constitutional failsafe against “pocket vetoes”, meaning that they 
were signed into law by the prime minister and the speakers of Mazhilis and Senate, and 
thus entered into force nonetheless. By using a pocket veto, rather than sending the bills 
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back to parliament, Nazarbayev ensured that the bills would still be implemented and 
increased his personal power. 
Veto use in Russia, 2008-2018 
In contrast to Kazakhstan, Russia enjoyed a period of (limited) political pluralism in the 
1990s (see Figures 1 and 2) and the country saw not only one but three presidents in 
power since the collapse of the Soviet Union – although some may argue that Vladimir 
Putin never really left the presidency during his hiatus as prime minister, 2008-2012. 
However, since Putin’s first election as president in May 2000, democracy has taken a 
downward turn and the country is almost unanimously classified as an authoritarian 
regime from 2004 (the year of Putin’s first re-election) onwards. The presidency is still 
based on the constitution pushed through by its inaugural holder Boris Yeltsin in 1993 
and names the president, not the government, as the dominant executive actor. 
However, the presidency has since granted itself additional powers through various 
decrees and extended its informal reach through “streamlining” of decision-making 
across institutions.63 This was always supplemented by a strong veto power, requiring 
2/3 of members in both chambers for an override. However, in contrast to many other 
post-Soviet presidents it is only a block veto without the possibility for amendatory 
observations (see Table 1). 
Patterns of veto use in Russia align closely with democracy indicators. After 
extensive veto use and frequent clashes between president and parliament during the 
1990s,64 presidential activism quickly subsided after Putin’s first election in 2000 – it 
has continuously fallen since with a particularly noteworthy decrease coinciding with 
his re-election in 2004. Since the election of Dimitry Medvedev in 2008, vetoes have 
become continuously less frequent (Table 3). At the same time, several authors have 
shown that the Duma still enjoys at least some freedom in law-making and show 
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examples of successful initiatives by individual deputies,65 which lends credence to the 




Following a decreasing, yet still regular veto use by Vladimir Putin during his 
first two terms Dimitri Medvedev only used his veto on four occasions. Yet, even this is 
remarkable given that many analysts have largely negated his potential for deliberative 
action. Nevertheless, the vetoes still corroborate my hypotheses and highlight a 
noteworthy additional aspect of presidential veto power in authoritarian regimes – the 
veto as a means of distraction, particularly for international audiences. Most 
prominently, in October 2010 the State Duma passed a bill amending the Law on 
Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Processions and Picketing that significantly 
curtailed citizens’ rights. The bill had raised no objections in the Federation Council, yet 
was criticized both domestically and internationally for its restrictiveness. Medvedev 
subsequently vetoed the bill for the same reasons, although many doubted that he 
genuinely opposed it.66 Rather, the veto served to protect the regime’s output legitimacy 
and stability. Given that similarly restrictive measures were implemented at a later date, 
the veto also served another purpose – it signalled that appropriate action had been 
taken at which point external audiences lost interest and pressure quickly diminished, 
allowing the regime to carry on as before. 
Since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, he only used his legislative veto 
power on two occasions; thereby, each veto supports one of my two hypotheses. Putin’s 
most recent veto of amendments to the laws on local government and education appears 
to have been motivated by protecting the regime’s output legitimacy. The bill foresaw 
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the introduction of an electronic “Student Body Information System”. Putin particularly 
criticized that the bill did not include a list of what information would be included and 
who would have access to it.67 Interestingly, the same criticism had already been voiced 
by the Liberal Democratic Party when the bill was debated in the Duma (its deputies 
still voted unanimously in favour of the bill in all three readings) but had not led to any 
changes. The bill was likewise approved by the Federation Council. It appears that it 
was only then that public opposition (channelled through a Just Russia MP) began to 
build and Putin vetoed the bill. Thus, shifting social conditions changed the assumptions 
underlying the bill, requiring a last-minute intervention by the president. 
In contrast, Putin’s veto of the law on the innovation centre “Skolkovo”, a 
Silicon Valley-style industry hub championed by Medvedev during his presidency, 
corroborates the second hypothesis. When Putin vetoed the bill in December 2012 
(seven months after returning to the presidency), he essentially criticized the project in 
its entirety. Putin not only raised doubts over the legitimacy of the project’s exemption 
from certain planning laws but also claimed that the bill failed to introduce any 
indicators to assess its economic, social and scientific results.68 Later developments, 
such as the opening of criminal investigations, censure of government ministers who 
spoke in support of the project, and public criticism by Putin himself,69 suggest that the 
bill was set to fail from the start (a form of discursive pre-emption). Failsafe 
mechanisms that would have stopped it before passage were deliberately disabled by the 
presidency in order to re-establish Putin as the leading political figure and reinforce his 
power vis-à-vis other actors. 
Discussion: common trends and diverging strategies 
The findings from the analysis of presidential veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia 
generally align with the theoretical considerations made in this study yet also add some 
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qualifying insights. First, Nazarbayev’s vetoes of the pension reform and Civil Service 
Act and Putin’s veto of the establishment of an electronic student database highlighted 
how presidents used their veto power to avoid public discontent and sought to ensure a 
stable output legitimacy of the regime. In contrast, the vetoes of the bills on Nauryz and 
the Skolkovo innovation centre illustrated how presidents used blame-shifting strategies 
to reinforce their own power – subordinate political actors were blamed for ill-informed 
choices (even if they originated in the presidency), while presidents took credit for 
averting (or delaying) unpopular outcomes. Interestingly, the Kazakh case showed that 
the latter could not only be achieved by sending bills back to the legislature but also by 
using a pocket veto. While vetoes can arguably serve both the regime’s and the 
president’s legitimacy at once (see Nazarbayev’s veto of the Civil Service Act in 
particular), the analysis has shown that we can still identify the dominant motivation. 
Second, the analysis suggests that presidential vetoes serve a very specific 
publicity purpose in authoritarian regimes. Although assertions that dictators’ support 
for legislatures is a means to legitimate their rule nationally and internationally are 
contested, vetoes may provide a particular way of appeasing international audiences and 
distract them from the substantive nature of the regime. Both Medvedev’s veto of the 
demonstration law amendments and Nazarbayev’s veto of a controversial press law in 
2004,70 responded more to international than national pressure, and sent a signal that 
action was taken (and the laws stopped). The later implementation of repressive 
measures by other means consequently failed to cause the same uproar. 
Last, in Russia the frequency of vetoes declined just as authoritarianism 
increased. While Kazakhstan never experienced the same degree of political pluralism, 
Belarus – another post-Soviet authoritarian regime – shows interesting similarities. In 
the two years after Aleksander Lukashenko’s first election as president in 1994 he 
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vetoed more than half of all bills, yet once he had consolidated his position veto use 
quickly subsided (only using it three times in the last 10 years, i.e. 0.28% of bills).71 
Overall, this could mean that overly frequent veto use is indicative of a move towards 
greater autocratization; subsequently declining veto may however not only be the result 
of presidents’ increased grip on the legislature but could also go hand-in-hand with 
legislators “learning” to interpret presidential preferences better over time. 
Conclusion     
The legislative process in authoritarian regimes, particularly the interaction between 
presidents and (formally) elected legislatures, still remains understudied. In seeking to 
explain why authoritarian president still use their legislative veto, this study addressed 
this shortcoming in several ways. The proposed theoretical framework synthetized and 
extended existing scholarship on the functions of elected authoritarian legislatures, 
explicating in particular the conditions for any independent decision-making by 
legislators. The results of the analysis not only largely supported these theoretical 
expectations and added valuable new empirical insights, but thereby also contributed to 
the growing evidence that authoritarian legislatures are more than mere “rubberstamps” 
of executive proposals. Finally, the study has provided the first investigation of 
presidential veto use beyond the realm of democratic regimes and highlighted their 
particular value as part of a “rational dictator’s” authoritarian toolkit. 
Sharing the difficulties underpinning research on authoritarian regimes, the 
results of this study are naturally limited to a certain extent.72 Reliable data and 
background information are hard to acquire in such information-poor environments, 
meaning that techniques to increase validity used in case studies of democratic 
presidents, such as the analysis of counterfactuals,73 cannot be applied as easily. To 
validate the results of this study future studies will need to gather additional data on a 
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more diverse range of cases, in particularly those that do not exhibit such a stable power 
equilibrium as the countries analysed here. The latter would also help to ascertain to 
what extent overly frequent veto use is associated with (further) autocratization, or 
indicates intra-elite struggle that invites public mobilization against the regime. Hereby, 
particular attention should be paid to other tools for presidential intervention in the 
legislative process that can be used in tandem with or instead of vetoes. These 
limitations notwithstanding, the article at hand presents an important first step in 
providing a comprehensive answer to the question of why dictators veto.  
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Table 1. Presidential veto power in post-Soviet hybrid and authoritarian regimes. 
Countrya Regime type Freedom House (2018) Block/Partial Veto Amendatory observations Override majority 
Armenia (2015) parliamentary Partly Free (4.5/7) (no veto power) – – 
Azerbaijan (1995) president-parliamentary Not Free (6.5/7) Yes/No No ≥ 2/3; ≥ 3/4 membersb 
Belarus (1996) president-parliamentary Not Free (6/7) Yes/Yes Yes ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Georgia (2013) premier-presidential Partly Free (3/7) Yes/No Yes ≥ 3/5 members 
Kazakhstan (1995) presidential Not Free (6/7) Yes/Yes Yes ≥ 2/3 members, both chambersc 
Kyrgyzstan (1993) premier-presidential Partly Free (5/7) Yes/No Yes ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Moldova (2016) premier-presidential Partly Free (3/7) Yes/No No ≥ 1/2 votes; ≥ 1/2 membersb 
Russia (1993) president-parliamentary Not Free (6.5/7) Yes/No No ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Tajikistan (1994) presidential Not Free (6.5/7) Yes/No No ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Turkmenistan (2003) presidential Not Free (7/7) Yes/No No ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Ukraine (2014) premier-presidential Partly Free (3/7) Yes/No Yes ≥ 2/3 membersc 
Uzbekistan (1992) presidential Not Free (7/7) Yes/No Yes ≥ 2/3 members, both chambers 
Note: a Year of last relevant constitutional change; b for constitutional acts; c 1/2 members to adopt presidential amendments. 
Source: Country constitutions; Elgie and Moestrup (2016); Freedom House (2018); Tsebelis and Rizova (2007). 
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Table 2. Legislative output and presidential vetoes in Kazakhstan, 2007-2018. 
Session Time period Bills passeda Bills vetoed 
4 I 10/2007 – 07/2008 32 0 
4 II 10/2008 – 08/2009 72 1 
4 III 09/2009 – 07/2010 66 0b 
4 IV 10/2010 – 07/2011 64 0 
4 V 10/2011 – 02/2012 52 0 
5 I 03/2012 – 07/2012 19 0 
5 II 10/2012 – 07/2013 50 1 
5 III 10/2013 – 07/2014 58 0 
5 IV 10/2014 – 08/2015 46 0 
5 V 10/2015 – 04/2016 98 1 
6 I 04/2016 – 07/2016 4 0 
6 II 10/2016 – 06/2017 66 0 
6 III 09/2017 – 06/2018 65 0 
 Total 692 3 
Notes: a all acts presented to the president for signature; bpocket veto of two bills.  
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Table 3. Legislative output and presidential vetoes in Russia, 2008-2018. 
President Year Bills passeda 
Bills vetoed by the president 
FC approval No FC approval Total 
Medvedev 05-12/2008 254 1 0 1 
 2009 394 1 0 1 
 2010 452 1 1 2 
 2011 432 0 0 0 
 01-04/2012 47 0 0 0 
Putin 05-12/2012 290 1 0 1 
 2013 451 0 0 0 
 2014 555 0 0 0 
 2015 480 0 0 0 
 2016 526 1 0 1 
 2017 512 0 0 0 
 01-07/2018 343 0 0 0 
      
Total  4736 5 1 6 
Note: FC=Federation Council; a all acts presented to the president for signature. 
  




Notes: The score is the average for political rights and civils liberties; 1-2.5=Free; 3-
5=Partly Free; 5.5-7=Not Free. 
Source: Freedom House (2018). 



































































Notes: Extent to which the ideal of liberal democracy has been achieved; 1=fully 
achieved, 0=not achieved. 
Source: Coppedge et al. 2019. 
Figure 2. Liberal Democracy Index (V-Dem) in Kazakhstan and Russia, 1993-2018.  
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